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I. INTRODUCTION
[W]hat are the police powers of a state? They are nothing more or
less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty
. . . . And whether a State passes a quarantine law[ ] or a law . . . to
regulate commerce . . . , in every case it exercises the same power;
. . . the power to govern men and things within the limits of its
dominion. It is by virtue of this power that it legislates . . . . 2
[The Fourteenth Amendment] disable[s] a State from depriving not
merely a citizen of the United States, but any person, whoever he
may be, of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or
from denying to him the equal protection of the laws of the State.
This abolishes all class legislation . . . giv[ing] to the humblest, the
poorest, the most despised of the race the same rights and the same
1. J.D. Candidate, May 2014. The author would like to thank his entire
family for their support, including his younger siblings: Jessica, Matthew, and
Kathleen. He would also like to thank Samantha Donne for her patience and
encouragement and his friends for their loyalty. Thank you to his editors at
The John Marshall Law Review, especially Thomas Ferguson. Finally, he
would like to dedicate this Comment to his parents, Jon and Jane, the
hardest-working, most generous people he knows.
2. License Cases, 46 U.S. 504, 583 (1847) (emphasis added)
(exemplifying a broad description of the States’ police powers and advocating
for judicial restraint).
1127
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protection before the law as it gives to the most powerful, the most
wealthy, or the most haughty. That . . . is republican government[ ]
and . . . a just government. 3

The two concepts detailed above are deeply rooted in
Constitutional Law. In the arena of litigation, they are often pitted
against each other, leaving the courts to balance the differing
interests. 4 The words of then Michigan Senator Jacob Howard, a
Fourteenth Amendment draftee, uphold the lasting American
principle - that all men are created equal. 5 For centuries, that
phrase was meaningless in its application for many different
groups of minorities. 6 Justice Thurgood Marshall was a champion
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 His view on individual rights will
be an important part of this Comment.
Although impressive steps have been taken to ameliorate
the status of these underrepresented groups through legislation
and judicial interpretation, 8 the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment has had its share of recent invocations.
One field that has seen numerous challenges is illegal
immigration. 9 With some scholars going so far as to refer to the

3. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2766 (1866) (demonstrating the
plain meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment as intending to apply to all
persons regardless of citizenship. Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan, member
of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction that drafted the Fourteenth
Amendment, spoke of its purposes with respect to the recently emancipated
slaves, but its message was intended to be a reflection of a strong federal
government).
4. See generally Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Brown v. Board of
Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., 347 U.S. 583 (1954); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886) (enunciating the Supreme Court’s role in reviewing a state
regulation under the purview of the Equal Protection Clause and how it
affects each state’s citizens’ rights).
5. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
6. See Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United
States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1-5 (1987) (reminding Americans
that when the Founding Fathers used the phrase “We the people” in 1789,
they did not include every person within the jurisdiction of the Nation – just
free persons, and that it has taken a constitutional evolution to spark and
continue the progression of civil rights).
7. See Anita Hill, A Tribute to Thurgood Marshall: A Man Who Broke
with Tradition on Issues of Race and Gender, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 127, 127-28
(Spring 1994) (opining that Justice Marshall’s greatest contribution to the
American society was forcing the law to respect the individual); see also Janet
Alexander, TM, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1231, 1234-35 (Summer 1992) (identifying
Justice Marshall’s legacy as one of a moral steadfastness to improving the
Constitution in the field of Civil Rights).
8. See generally Brown, 347 U.S. at 583 (finding racial segregation in
schools unconstitutional).
9. See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 202 (involving children of unlawfully
admitted parents who sought injunctive and declaratory relief against a Texas
Statute that denied them enrollment in the public school system).
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current immigration situation as a “crisis,” 10 the need for clear
legislation for both the effective enforcement and interpretation of
the laws is evident. 11
This Comment will attempt to balance the interests of
Arizona and Alabama in combating the growing problem of
undocumented immigration against the interest of the documented
and undocumented aliens and U.S. citizens protected by the Equal
Protection Clause.
The Comment will start by briefly discussing the history of
State regulation of immigration. It will then juxtapose that
historical context with the current immigration situation that
states such as Arizona and Alabama face today.
With those circumstances displayed, the Comment will
review the goals put forth by the states when regulating
immigration. Those goals often involve regulating individuals. The
constitutionally protected interests of the documented and
undocumented aliens and U.S. citizens must be weighed and
analyzed. How the Court weighs those interests and the deference
it gives to the states is the heart of this Comment.
The Comment will traverse through the Supreme Court’s
different standards of review. It will conclude by proposing a
standard of review unique to the issue of illegal immigration partly based on precedent and partly based on the implications
such laws have on Latino individuals. There is a place for state
participation in contemporary immigration legislation, but the
standards imposed on the states must reflect the circumstances
involved.

II. BACKGROUND
A. The Role of the State in Controlling Its Borders
The Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States, 12 severely
limited the states’ authority in the field of immigration
regulation. 13 The Arizona statute under review prompted
discussion as to whether the federal government has the exclusive
power to regulate immigration, and if not, what would be left to
10. See GODFREY Y. MUWONGE, IMMIGRATION REFORM: WE CAN DO IT,
WE APPLY OUR FOUNDERS’ TRUE IDEALS, 17 (Hamilton Books 2009)
(likening modern day immigration legislation to that of the Chinese Exclusion
Act of 1882, which failed to deny the immigration of Chinese laborers during
the Gold Rush).
11. See id. (demonstrating the inadequacy of contemporary immigration
laws; Muwonge indicates that twelve to twenty million undocumented
immigrants were estimated to be residing in the United States in 2007).
12. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
13. See id. at 2498 (reinforcing the federal government’s “broad,
undoubted power over the subject of immigration . . .”).
IF
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the States. 14 An important aspect of this discussion, from
Arizona’s perspective, was the origin of the states’ inherent
authority to regulate. 15 From where, either inherently or textually
supported in the Constitution, do states like Arizona and Alabama
locate this power?
1. State Sovereignty as It Relates to Immigration
It is undisputed that the individual states have
sovereignty. 16 The notion of “dual sovereignty” 17 was no more
relevant than during the early developments of the Union. 18 Each
state had its own concerns about how the ratification of the
Constitution and subsequent legislation would change its
historical independence and autonomy. 19
One such area of independence was the relationship
between the State and its citizens. 20 Immigration regulation was
14. See id. at 2500 (tempering the “pervasiveness” of federal regulation
in immigration with the acknowledgment that states must have immigration
policies of their own).
15. See id. at 2511 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting that “as a sovereign, [the state] has the inherent power to exclude
persons from its territory, subject only to those limitations expressed in the
Constitution or constitutionally imposed by Congress.”).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514
U.S. 779, 802 (1995) (recognizing that the States retain a “significant measure
of sovereign authority,” but only to the extent that the Constitution has not
dispossessed them of those residual powers); see also Timothy Zick, Active
Sovereignty, 21 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 541, 543 (Spring 2007)
(indicating that the dual characteristic of federalism includes a certain degree
of “respecting the states as states”).
17. See Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(likening the “dual character” of federalism to “split[ting] the atom of
sovereignty . . . ,” thereby creating two political capacities: one state and one
federal).
18. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 271 (1983) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing that “[d]uring the earliest years of our constitutional
development, principles of federalism were not only well recognized, they
formed the basis for virtually every State in the Union to assert its rights as a
State against the Federal Government”).
19. See, e.g., Ky. Res. 1798 (Nov. 10, 1798) (declaring the Alien and
Sedition Acts unconstitutional, while reaffirming state sovereignty and state
authority over aliens who are under the jurisdiction of the state in which they
reside); Va. Res. 1798 (Dec. 24, 1798) (protesting the Alien and Sedition Acts
as unconstitutional and infringing on the residual powers left to the States);
see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 at 377 (James Madison)(Oxford World’s
Classics ed., 2008) (reiterating that each state came to the ratification table as
an independent sovereign).
20. See Ky. Res. 1798 (Nov. 10, 1798); see also Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492,
2511) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102,
132 (1837)) (demonstrating that throughout history the states’ relationship
with its citizens included regulating the influx of immigrants); Gerald
Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93
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not always a function of the federal government. 21 There was a
time when the states, or soon-to-be-states, patrolled the influx of
immigrants according to their own standards. 22 This not only
suggests that the states acted independently in this regard, but
also that this was inevitably part of their inherent “internal police”
authority at the time of the formation of the Union. 23 It is not a
foreign concept, therefore, to consider that the states may regulate
immigration as they see fit, with the recognition that at one point,
this was entirely and absolutely part of their authority. 24
2. Federal Intervention in the Regulation of Immigration
Although the focus of this Comment will not be
preemption, it is important to note the comprehensive schematic
approach that Congress has taken to address the immigration
issue. Once Congress adopted an intervening role with the
naturalization of all U.S. citizens, the states were left to pick and
choose their regulatory fields. 25 As federal legislation increased,
the threat of preemption rendered the States’ Tenth Amendment
police powers less significant. 26
The Constitution specifically vests the power to enact rules
of naturalization, impose duties on imports, and regulate
commerce with Congress. 27 According to those Constitutional
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1834-35 (Dec. 1993) (cautioning that by ignoring the
states’ historical authority to regulate immigration it “impairs constitutional
understandings of the scope and character of federal immigration power . . .”).
21. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2512 (2012).
22. Neuman, supra note 19, at 1841 (identifying five categories of
traditional state immigration legislation, including crime, public health,
poverty, slavery, and racial subordination).
23. See Miln, 36 U.S. at 139 (holding that the powers that relate to the
internal policies of the states are retained by the states).
24. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2513 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (concluding
that there was no doubt as to the existence of the state power to regulate
immigration prior to the adoption of the Constitution).
25. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976) (admitting that the
power to regulate immigration is a federal power, but stopping short of
recognizing per se preemption of any state regulations that also dealt with
aliens or immigration); Chamber of Commerce of United States v. Whiting,
131 S. Ct. 1968, 1987 (2011) (finding that a federal law may reserve to the
states the authority to regulate in a field of immigration as long as the state
uses the least conflicting measures).
26. See, e.g., Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1975 (finding that due to a more
comprehensive federal scheme in the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(1986), state laws like the one previously upheld in DeCanas would be
expressly preempted by federal law).
27. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 4 (vesting the power to establish a
uniform naturalization process in Congress); U.S. CONST. art. I § 9 cl. 1
(allowing the states to regulate the migration of persons across state lines as
they see fit until 1808); U.S. CONST. art. I § 10 cl. 2 (forbidding the states from
laying duties on imports).
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powers, Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act in
1952, 28 the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986, 29 and
most recently, the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act in 1996. 30 These Acts gradually limited the
once-held power of the States to control their borders 31 through
federal preemption. 32
An important takeaway from this Congressional
intervention is that despite its best efforts, there are still areas
within the field of immigration where the states may regulate
according to their constitutionally valid police powers. 33 A state’s
interest may justify legislation of its own unless preempted by
federal law. 34 In such a case, the nature of those interests will
determine whether the state had reason to enter into a field that is
“unquestionably . . . a federal power.” 35
3. The Current Immigration Landscape in Arizona and Alabama
There are two statutory provisions relevant to this
discussion. One is section 2(B) of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 Statute (“S.B
1070”), 36 which requires police officers, in certain circumstances, to
verify a person’s immigration status when conducting a stop. 37 The
28. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1952).
29. Immigration Reform and Control Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1160, 1187, 1188,
1255a, 1324a, 1324b, 1364, 1365 (1986).
30. Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub.
L. 104-208, 104th Cong. (Sept. 30, 1996).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I § 9 cl. 1.
32. See generally Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968; Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492;
United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1284 (11th Cir. 2012) (striking down
state statutes that were found to have been impliedly and/or expressly
preempted by federal law); see also Gary Endelman & Cynthia Lange, State
Immigration Legislation and the Preemption Doctrine, 1698 PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE, 123, 127 (Oct. 14-15, 2008) (discussing the authority of Congress to
regulate immigration and the states’ attempt to work around Congress’
various legislative enactments and provisions).
33. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1974 (noting areas of regulation where
states retain broad authority under their police powers); id. at 1987 (noting
that it is Congress who preempts state laws and not the judiciary, and that
finding a state law preempted requires Congress to meet a high threshold).
34. See id. at 1987 (holding that because the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 did not preempt Arizona’s employment regulation, a valid
interest under its police powers, the State may exercise that authority without
conflicting with federal power).
35. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355.
36. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (2010).
37. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2010). (section B states:
For any lawful stop . . . made by a law enforcement official . . . where
reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully
present in the United States, a reasonable attempt shall be made, when
practicable, to determine the immigration status of the person . . . . The
person's immigration status shall be verified with the federal
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second is section 31-13-12 of Alabama’s Beason-Hammon Alabama
Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act (“HB 56”), which allows the
same. 38 A more thorough analysis will be conducted below, but for
contextual purposes, these statutes are relevant to demonstrate
the immigration situation in Arizona and in Alabama. Why enact
such stringent laws when a federal scheme was already in place?
The answer lies in what many have referred to as a growing
“crisis.” 39
a. Statistical Data: Evidence of the “Crisis” in Arizona
When S.B. 1070 was passing through the State Legislature
in 2010, Arizona had just seen a decade of unprecedented

government pursuant to 8 United States Code § 1373(c). A law
enforcement official . . . may not consider race, color or national origin in
implementing the requirements of this subsection except to the extent
permitted by the United States or Arizona Constitution. A person is
presumed to not be an alien who is unlawfully present in the United
States if the person provides to the law enforcement officer or agency
any of the following:
1. A valid Arizona driver license.
2. A valid Arizona nonoperating identification license.
3. A valid tribal enrollment card or other form of tribal identification.
4. If the entity requires proof of legal presence in the United States
before issuance, any valid United States federal, state or local
government issued identification . . .).
38. ALA. CODE § 31-13-12(a-e) (2011) (Section 12 of the Alabama Code
states:
(a) Upon any lawful stop . . . where reasonable suspicion exists that the
person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States, a
reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable, to determine the
citizenship and immigration status of the person, . . . .
(b) . . . The alien's immigration status shall be verified by contacting the
federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) within 24 hours of
the time of the alien's arrest . . . .
(c) . . . A law enforcement officer may not consider race, color, or national
origin in implementing the requirements of this section except to the
extent permitted by the United States Constitution or the Constitution
of Alabama of 1901 . . . .
(d) . . .
(e) If an alien is determined by the federal government to be an alien
who is unlawfully present in the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1373(c), the law enforcement agency shall cooperate in the transfer of
the alien to the custody of the federal government, if the federal
government so requests);
see also, Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1284 (acknowledging the Supreme Court ruling
in Arizona, the court found that the similar provision in the Alabama Code is
not preempted by federal law).
39. See Muwonge, supra note 9, at 16 (indicating that as the debate on
immigration gained speed in 2005, partisans began referring to the situation
as an “immigration crisis” due to the heavy influx of illegal immigrants and
the lack of a consistent federal plan of enforcement).
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population growth. 40 Although numbers throughout the country
had risen, 41 certain Arizona cities were among the Nation’s
highest. 42 There is evidence to suggest that, unsurprisingly, the
proximity of the U.S.-Mexican border accounted for the majority of
this growth. 43 Problems associated with this population growth
included crime, 44 unemployment, and misappropriated healthcare,
amongst others. 45 It prompted the Arizona Legislature to propose
a bill. 46
S.B. 1070 was enacted as an anti-illegal immigration law,
targeted at a specific group already federally identified. 47 The
problems addressed by the bill naturally corresponded to the
40. See Paul Mackum & Steve Wilson, Population Distribution and
Change: 2010 Census Briefs, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 2 (March 2011), www
.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf (demonstrating that Arizona
was the second fastest growing state in the Nation between the years 2000
and 2010 at a 24.6% incremental change).
41. See id. (comparing individual state population growth to the
National average growth of 9.7%).
42. See id. at 9 (charting the population growth for the ten most
populous and ten fastest growing counties from 2000-2010); id. (noting
specifically in Table 4 that Maricopa County, AZ saw a 24.2% increase in
population from 2000-2010 while Pinal County, AZ grew at a rate of 109.1%
over the same span).
43. See Immigration Ground Zero: Arizona, The Fruit of Congress’
Failure, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 26, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 25434402
(indicating that in the midst of Arizona’s surge in population growth, 14% of
the six million people were foreign born, and that much of that growth could
be explained by the illegal influx of undocumented aliens); see also
Immigration Figures to Bug Your Eyes Out, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, March
25, 2005, at B9, available at 2005 WLNR 26864628 (stating that one third of
Arizona’s population growth over the past five years was a direct result of an
increase in the immigration of undocumented aliens).
44. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500 (exemplifying the dangers of drug
cartels by examining a sign posted along an Arizona highway that read
“DANGER . . . Active Drug and Human Smuggling Area/Visitors May
Encounter Armed Criminals and Smuggling Vehicles.”).
45. See id. (citing numerous statistical sources that indicate the
consequences of Arizona’s illegal immigration problem, including bearing the
responsibility for “a disproportionate share in serious crime,” safety risks,
property damage, environmental damage, and drug smuggling); see also Ariz.
Legis. Serv. Ch. 113 § 1 (2010) (declaring the intent of S.B. 1070 is “ to make
attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state and local
government agencies in Arizona . . . . [T]o work together to discourage and
deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by
persons unlawfully present in the United States.”); Immigration to Arizona,
U.S. IMMIGRATION SUPPORT, www.usimmigrationsupport.org/arizona.html
(last updated Oct. 4, 2012) (indicating that between the years of 2000 and
2010 providing healthcare to undocumented aliens cost Arizona hospitals an
estimated $150 million annually).
46. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2010).
47. See H.B. 2162, 49th Legislature, 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010)
(amending section 11-1051 of the Arizona Revised Statutes to specifically
target illegal immigrants).
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growing numbers of undocumented aliens. These numbers made
up part of S.B. 1070’s relevant findings. 48 What remained of the
bill after the Court’s ruling in Arizona would pit Arizona’s interest
against a new challenger: Civil Rights advocates. 49
b. Statistical Data: A Similar “Crisis” in Alabama?
Similar laws were enacted in other states across the
nation, 50 but Alabama’s HB 56 and current immigration situation
make it a good comparison case.
Arizona’s population spike has a territorial connection
with an immigration source in Mexico. Alabama does not share
that characteristic. The racial composition of Alabama reflects
this. 51 The estimated percentage of “Persons of Hispanic or Latino

48. See S. F. Sheet, S.B. 1070, 49th Legislature, 2d. Reg. Sess. (Jan. 22,
2010) (indicating that the purpose of the bill was to deter immigration by
allowing police officers more discretion in enforcing federal deportation
procedures).
49. See Howard Fischer, Time Running Out, Civil Rights Groups
Challenge SB 1070, AZDAILYSUN.COM (Sept. 12, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://azdaily
sun.com/news/state-and-regional/time-running-out-civil-rights-groups-challen
ge-sb/article_906966ce-4328-517f-b23f-b3690686ff45.html (recounting the
frantic attempts of Civil Rights groups in Arizona to challenge S.B. 1070 for
causing irreparable harm to Latinos in the form of racial profiling and
discrimination); Arizona Immigration Law Fight Continues for Civil Rights
Groups, HUFFINGTON POST (last updated July 2, 2012 12:42 PM), www.huffing
tonpost.com/2012/07/02/arizona-immigration-law-civil-rights-fight_n_1641679
.html (identifying groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”)
and the National Immigration Law Center as two advocates on behalf of
potentially profiled Latinos throughout Arizona as a result of S.B. 1070 section
2(B)); see also Press Release, Appeals Court Asked to Block Show-Me-YourPapers Provision of Arizona Anti-Immigration Law, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION
LAW CENTER (Sept. 14, 2012) available at http://nilc.org/nr2_091412.html
(noting that the fundamental rights of Arizona Latinos are in danger, and
without an injunction they are likely to endure irreparable harm); Petitioners’
Emergency Motion Under Circuit Court Rule 27-3 for an Injunction Pending
Appeal, Valle de Sol v. Whiting, No. 12-17406 (9th Cir. 2012) (pleading for
injunctive relief as the petitioners stand to face “racial profiling, police
scrutiny, and prolonged detention”).
50. See Anna Gorman, Arizona’s immigration law isn’t the only one, LA
TIMES (July 16, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/16/nation/la-naimmigration-states-20100717 (listing Pennsylvania, Michigan, Rhode Island
and Minnesota as states that have all enacted Arizona-like immigration laws);
Harriet McLeod, Judge Keeps South Carolina Immigration Law on Hold After
Arizona Ruling, REUTERS (July 9, 2012 7:28 PM), www.reuters.com/article
/2012/07/09/us-usa-immigration-scarolina-idUSBRE86812Q20120709 (adding
South Carolina, Alabama, Utah, and Indiana to “show-me-your-papers” list).
51. See State and County Quickfacts – Alabama, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
(last visited Oct. 5, 2012), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/01000.html
(estimating that in 2011 the percentage of persons of Hispanic or Latino origin
in Alabama was at 4.0%).
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Origin” 52 in 2011 was 4.9, or about 235,334 people out of the total
population of 4,802,704. 53 Though this number does not seem
striking when compared to the composition of states like Arizona
and California, 54 the decade of growth that led to that number was
what concerned most Alabama Representatives. 55
From 2000 to 2012 Alabama’s Hispanic population was the
“fastest growing group in the state . . . .” 56 It is important to note
that these numbers represent Alabama’s Hispanic population in
general, according to the 2000 and 2010 U.S. censuses, and makes
no mention of whether they are documented or undocumented numbers that can only be speculated. 57 Of equal importance,
however, is that the House Sponsor of HB 56, Micky Hammon,

52. See infra notes 93, 125 and accompanying text (identifying
“Hispanic” as a government-created term with negative connotations). Please
note that this Comment will only use “Hispanic” when referring to the
government designation, and will use “Latino” in all other respects.
53. Cf. State and County Quickfacts – Arizona, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
(last visited Oct. 5, 2012), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/04000.html
(estimating that the percentage of Hispanic or Latino persons in Arizona in
2011 made up 30.1% of the overall population).
54. See State and County Quickfacts – California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
(last visited Oct. 5, 2012), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html
(listing California’s Hispanic estimated population at 38.1% of the overall
population).
55. See ALA. CODE 31-13-2 (2011) (supporting HB 56’s strong stance on
illegal immigration with findings that it has caused “economic hardship and
lawlessness . . . [,] adverse[] affect[s] [on] the availability of public education
resources to students who are United States citizens . . . ” and has
“undermine[d] the security of our borders . . . .”); see also Transcript,
Alabama’s Immigration Law: Radical or within Reason?, PUBLIC
BROADCASTING SYSTEM (aired on Aug. 24, 2011), available at www.pbs.org
/newshour/bb/law/july-dec11/alabama_08-24.html (revealing the reasoning
behind HB 56’s enactment, through one of its main contributors Kansas
Secretary of State Ken Kobach, as a step towards “stop[ping] illegal
immigration” and “helping to discourage and deter illegal immigration”).
56. See Yanji Djamba et al., The Hispanic Population in Alabama,
CENTER FOR DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH – AUBURN UNIVERSITY AT
MONTGOMERY, 1 (May 2011), available at www.demographics.aum.edu/docs/re
ports/hispanicpopulation-abridged.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (demonstrating that the
Hispanic population in Alabama from the years 2000 to 2010 doubled in size,
representing a growth rate of 144.8%, the second highest over that span in the
United States); see also Catalina Jaramillo, Census: Alabama Latino
Population up 145% in 10 Years, NEW AMERICA MEDIA (posted Nov. 8 2011),
http://newamericamedia.org/2011/11/census-alabama-latino-population-up-145in-10-years.php (hypothesizing that the actual number of persons of the
Latino race in Alabama did not rise from 75,830 to 185,602, but actually rose
closer to 200,000 people, when including the non-census persons).
57. See Djamba, supra note 55, at 1 (limiting the report to the census
numbers and making no distinction between undocumented and documented
Hispanics).
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made that connection, referencing the unprecedented growth in
the Hispanic population as a reason for the law’s enactment. 58
The provisions within HB 56 reveal what illegal
immigration problems the Alabama legislature viewed as most
pressing at the time. These included provisions regulating
employment, education, and healthcare benefits, voter
registration, police discretion, and the employment of
undocumented aliens. 59 Because Alabama’s total population
growth coincided with its steep Hispanic population growth, a
certain racial cognizance developed among its representatives and
residents alike. 60
HB 56, like S.B. 1070, spawned constitutional
complainants in the form of ardent Civil Rights Groups on behalf
of Latino citizens, lawfully admitted Latino immigrants and
undocumented aliens. 61

58. See Alabama’s Shame: HB 56 and the War on Immigrants,
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, 4 (Feb. 2012) www.splcenter.org/sites/def
ault/files/downloads/publication/SPLC_HB56_AlabamasShame.pdf (chastising
Alabama Representative Micky Hammon for citing the increase in the
Hispanic population growth as an indicator of the increase in the population of
undocumented aliens, convoluting the two terms); Mary Bauer, Court Cites
Discriminatory Intent Behind Anti-Immigration Law, SOUTHERN POVERTY
LAW CENTER (Dec. 14, 2011), http://splcenter.org/get-informed/news/courtcites-discriminatory-intent-behind-alabamas-anti-immigrant-law (noting that
Hammon’s and the legislature’s correlation between the Hispanic population
growth between 2000 and 2010 and the rise in undocumented aliens in
Alabama was referenced in a District Court ruling where Judge Myron
Thompson noted that “‘Hispanic’ and ‘illegal immigrant’ [were used]
interchangeably”).
59. ALA. CODE § 31-13-2 (2011); see also Eric A. Ruark, HB 56: Helping
to Move Alabama’s Economy Forward, FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION REFORM, 1 (April 2012) available at www.fairus.org/DocServer
/hb56.pdf (standing by HB 56 as a beneficial measure for reviving the
Alabama economy, arguing that the key to a thriving economy is creating
incentives for employers to hire locally by providing opportunities to lesseducated Alabama residents).
60. See Ruark, supra note 58, at 1 (maintaining that illegal immigration
is at odds with the economic goals of Alabama and its citizens).
61. See U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Hearing on Aug. 17, 2012 in
Birmingham, AL (Testimony of Mary Bauer, Legal Director, Southern Poverty
Law Center), at 3-5, available at http://cdna.splcenter.org/sites/default/files
/mbcr.pdf (noting that the real world effects of this anti-illegal immigration
law include the ripping apart of Latino families, the devastation of the Latino
communities and a decline in the state’s economy and education); see also
Racial Profiling After HB 56: Stories from the Alabama Hotline, NATIONAL
IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, at 2-4 (Aug. 2012) available at www.nilc.org
/document.html?id=800 (chronicling both legal and illegal residents’ distresses
and fears since the imposition of HB 56); Hearing, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE
ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES, AND BORDER
CONTROL, Examining the Constitutionality and Prudence of State and Local
Governments Enforcing Immigration Law, (Apr. 24 2012) (identifying the
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4. The Individual Rights of Undocumented and Documented
Aliens and Latino U.S. Citizens
After the preemption lines have been drawn, and states
such as Arizona and Alabama stagger back to implement what
remains of their laws, they must face another constitutional
hurdle. The crux of this Comment, and the center of the conflict
presented is what rights the undocumented aliens have when a
state attempts to directly regulate them; and additionally, what
rights the legal aliens and lawful citizens have when a state’s
immigration laws indirectly affect them.
Many advocates have already asserted those rights in
support of documented and undocumented aliens alike, and urged
the judiciary to review Arizona and Alabama’s laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 62 These laws have created victims of
racial profiling and social stereotyping, both directly and
indirectly. 63 Those interests must be protected, but at what cost?
How should the traditional Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court be applied in this context?
In the sections to come, this Comment will analyze why
state regulation is important in an era that has seen remarkable
population growth coupled with an economic crisis, 64 but also, why
the interests of undocumented and documented aliens, whose
identification is oftentimes presupposed by race, 65 are of equal or
greater importance.
National Immigration Law Center as a challenger to state laws in Arizona,
Utah, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Alabama).
62. See Emergency Motion Under Circuit Rule 27-3 For An Injunction
Pending Appeal, Valle del Sol v. Whiting, supra note 48, at i-iii (naming
numerous additional counsel on behalf of appellants all advocating for illegal
Latino immigrants’ and lawful Latino residents’ rights, including: America
Civil Liberties Union Foundation Immigrant’s Rights Project, Mexican
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, National Day Labor
Organizing Network, amongst others).
63. See Alabama’s Shame: HB 56 and the War on Immigrants, supra
note 57, at 3 (shaming the Alabama legislature with stories from the state’s
Latino population, claiming the that HB 56 “virtually guarantees racial
profiling, discrimination and harassment against all Latinos . . . ,” their
citizenship status notwithstanding); see also Fernando Santos, Confronted in
Court With His Own Words, Sherriff Denies Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
2012, available at 2012 WLNR 15503971 (displaying the negative effects of
section 2 of SB 1070 when immigration procedures are left to the discretion of
local law enforcement).
64. Moria Herbst, Immigration Amid a Recession, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (May 8, 2009), www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/cont
ent/may2009/db2009058_701427.htm (noting that the relationship between
illegal immigration and the U.S. economy hinges on whether the
undocumented workers are complimenting U.S. workers or replacing them).
65. VICTORIA HATTAM, IN THE SHADOW OF RACE: JEWS, LATINOS, AND
IMMIGRANT POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 121 (Univ. of Chicago Press
2007):
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III. ANALYSIS
A. The Purview of the Equal Protection Clause and the
Differing Levels of Judicial Scrutiny
It is well established that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause protects all persons under the jurisdiction
of the laws of the State regardless of that person’s citizenship
status. 66 An alien’s illegal status does not deny him the equal
protection of a state’s laws. 67
When attacked under the Equal Protection Clause, a
state’s law-made classification will be viewed according to one of
three different levels of judicial scrutiny. This three-tiered
approach includes rational basis, the most deferential standard;
intermediate scrutiny, a heightened standard based on the
circumstances; and strict scrutiny, the most demanding standard.
State legislators are given discretion to determine how to
regulate their constituency. 68 State regulation of undocumented
aliens presents a somewhat unique situation that could
hypothetically involve an overlapping comprehensive federal

Difference was not limited to race, but rather had long accommodated
identities tied to creed and national origin . . . . [The Office of
Management and Budget] institutionalized a set of presumptions about
the heterogeneous nature of difference in the United States in which
ethnicity was given a place in the emerging ethno-racial taxonomy.
See also Vanessa Cardenas & Sophia Kerby, The State of Latinos in the United
States, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, 9 (Aug. 7, 2012), available at
www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/08/pdf/stateoflatinos.pdf
(indicating that an estimated “16.6 million people, many of Hispanic Origin,
live in mixed-status families with at least one unauthorized alien family
member,” which demonstrates how the impact of the Arizona and Alabama
laws will be felt not only by undocumented Latino aliens but also their
documented Latino family members and friends).
66. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215 (confirming that the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment includes citizens and strangers within the territories
of the States); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (including the
“millions” of aliens within the borders of the United States under the
protection of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 6
(establishing that the Fourteenth Amendment is not confined to only protect
U.S. citizens).
67. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215.
68. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)
(demonstrating judicial restraint in refraining from judging the “wisdom,
fairness, or logic of legislative choices”); see also People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154,
161 (1915) (authorizing the states to discriminate between citizens and noncitizens in the distribution of its resources). But see Truax v. Raich, 36 S. Ct. 7,
10 (acknowledging the broad powers of the state to promote the health, safety,
morals, and welfare of its citizens, the Court still refused to extend that
authority to deny employment to lawful state residents on the basis of
national origin).
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objective, 69 creation of a subclass citizenry, race-based
discrimination, or a combination of all three. This potentially
qualifies it for all three judicial levels of scrutiny. Accordingly, the
comment will analyze S.B. 1070’s and HB 56’s relevant provisions
under all three levels.
1. Classifying Undocumented Aliens and the Rational Basis
Standard
The Supreme Court will rarely interfere with a state’s
democratic process. 70 This deference to the state demonstrates the
amount of restraint the Supreme Court Justices will exercise when
a state classification does not involve a suspect class or is strictly a
socio-economic regulation. 71 Under this test, the classification
must only reasonably relate to a legitimate state purpose. 72
When a state discriminates on the basis of alienage, it has
been viewed under strict judicial scrutiny. 73 However, the
Supreme Court has limited that class exclusively to lawfully
admitted aliens. 74 Therefore, when a law such as Arizona’s S.B.
1070 or Alabama’s HB 56 makes it clear that it targets only
undocumented aliens, 75 that group falls outside the suspect class.
A statute targeting only illegal immigration would be viewed

69. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).
70. FCC, 508 U.S. at 314 (allowing the democratic process to rectify
otherwise unwise decisions of the state legislatures).
71. Id.; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 (“A legislature must have substantial
latitude to establish classifications that roughly approximate the nature of the
problem perceived, that accommodate competing concerns both public and
private, and that account for limitations on the practical ability of the state to
remedy every ill.”); see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)
(requiring the state to meet a standard of reasonable basis when justifying
classifications in the field of economics and social welfare).
72. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485 (holding that a state’s legislative
decision meets the rational basis standard when “it does not offend the
Constitution . . .”).
73. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984) (identifying
classifications based on alienage to be subject to strict scrutiny); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-372 (1971) (reestablishing the court’s view that
classifications based on alienage, nationality, or race are inherently suspect).
74. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 372 (taking into consideration the rights of
lawful permanent resident aliens without also hypothetically considering
illegal aliens’ rights as a possible distinction); Mathews, 426 U.S. at 79, n.13
(listing the various classifications of aliens and including illegal aliens as an
afterthought); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223 (noting that undocumented aliens cannot
make up a suspect class because their presence is “in violation of federal law”
and not a “constitutional irrelevancy”).
75. See S.B. 1070 sec. 1, 49th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010)
(reiterating that the intent of the bill is to address the problems of unlawful
entry into the state); see also ALA. CODE § 31-13-2 (2011), (finding that illegal
immigration is causing economic hardship and lawlessness) (emphasis added).

2014]

The Usual Suspects

1141

under a rational basis test. 76 This is particularly true when its
purpose is in conformity with a federal objective. 77
Under the rational basis test, the Supreme Court would
likely give deference to Arizona and Alabama. Each state can point
to many legitimate governmental interests for implementing
section 2(B) of S.B. 1070 and section 31-13-12 of HB 56, including
crime, unemployment, healthcare, and tax collection. 78 If allowing
police officers to validate immigration statuses during lawful
detentions 79 is both rationally related to those interests and not
adverse to federal immigration objectives, it would likely survive
the Court’s deferential review. 80
The federal objective, deterring illegal immigration with
the help of delegated local officials, provides one avenue to the
rational basis test. The Court would consider whether the state’s
implementation of police discretion to determine the immigration
statuses of reasonably suspected undocumented aliens furthers a
shared federal and state objective. Because both target the same
group, the Court would give deference to the state’s use of its
federally approved police powers.
2. Classifying Undocumented Aliens and Intermediate Scrutiny
The Supreme Court case of Plyler v. Doe 81 opened the
possibility for a deviation from the traditional two-tiered equal
76. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
77. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(g), 1373(a), (c), 1644; Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2508
(noting that section 2(B) of Arizona’s statute must be “implemented in a
manner consistent with federal law regulating immigration, . . .” (quoting
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11 1051(B) (2010)); see also id. at 2509 (indicating
that unless the law has some other consequences that are adverse to federal
objectives, the provision is valid); DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 356 (acknowledging
the authority of the states to regulate its residents even when those residents
might be there unlawfully, especially when the regulation mirrors a federal
objective).
78. See Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 113 (S.B. 1070), 49th Congress, 2d Reg.
Sess. (West 2010) (revealing the intent behind the Act was to deter and
discourage the entry, presence, and economic activity of undocumented aliens
by “attrition through enforcement”); Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (listing many
different concerns facing Arizona with respect to undocumented aliens,
including crime, property damage, and drug trafficking); ALA. CODE § 31-13-2
(2011) (finding that illegal immigration has had adverse effects on funding for
education, economic growth, and law abidance in general).
79. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11 1051(B) (2010); ALA. CODE § 31-13-12(a)
(2011).
80. Id.; see also Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509; Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 at
1285 (finding section 12 of HB 56 to be unproblematic due to the fact that it
requests immigration information “explicitly contemplated by federal law”);
Cf. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226 (revealing that a very important part of the Court’s
analysis in striking down the Texas statute was the fact that it did not
“operate harmoniously within a federal program”).
81. Plyler, 457 U.S. 202.
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protection analysis in the context of illegal immigration. 82 Justice
Brennan’s opinion in Plyler suggests that certain circumstances
may warrant a heightened level of scrutiny even when specifically
dealing with unlawfully admitted aliens. 83
The surrounding circumstances in Plyler are what make
the case unique. 84 In Plyler, a Texas statute denied funding to
school districts for the education of undocumented children and
authorized those districts to deny them enrollment. 85 Justice
Brennan, seemingly persuaded by the District Court’s findings, 86
did not go as far as to apply strict scrutiny in review of the Texas
Statute, but did require that Texas’ exclusion of these children “be
justified by a showing that it furthers a substantial state
interest.” 87 This marked a deviation from the two-tiered standard
applied in earlier cases involving illegal and legal aliens. 88
The factors Brennan relied on were the importance of
elementary education and the threat that a denial of that
education would create a “subclass” citizenry. 89 While education
82. See id. at 231 (Marshall, J., concurring) (indicating that this case
presents a good example of why there should be varying levels of scrutiny,
instead of the traditional two-tiered rigid approach because it involves
constitutional significance, societal impact on immigration and education, and
an indication that there is a degree of invidiousness in the classification drawn
in the Texas statute).
83. Id. at 224 (heightening the level of judicial scrutiny to require that
the classification contained in the Texas statute furthers some substantial
goal of the State) (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 223 (mentioning that the Texas statute imposed costs on the
Nation and on an innocent discrete class of children, therefore its approval
required a showing of substantial interests on the part of the State); see also
id. (naming factors such as the importance of education and the innocence of
the children as to their situation as reasons why this situation is different
from the traditional equal protection cases involving undocumented aliens).
85. See id. at 205 (reading the Texas statute as applying to all children
not “legally admitted” to the United States).
86. See Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 582 (E.D. Tex. 1978)
(entertaining the idea of undocumented aliens as a suspect class noting that
their characteristics arguably reflect the traditional indicia of suspectness); id.
(reasoning that “[t]he issue of [undocumented aliens’] suspectness as a class is
raised by the uncontroverted history of their abuse and exploitation in certain
conditions and circumstances unrelated to the federal basis for their
extinction.”).
87. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224.
88. See generally Dandridge, 397 U.S. 471; Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356;
Graham, 403 U.S. 365; Mathews, 426 U.S. 67, Truax, 36 S. Ct. 7; McCready v.
State of Virgina, 94 U.S. 391, 396 (1876) (applying rational basis to
classifications that were not based on alienage and could instead be classified
as an economic or social regulation well within the ambit of the state’s valid
police powers).
89. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230 (admitting that it is difficult to
understand the motives of the state government in creating a “subclass of
illiterates” within Texas, and within the United States, that will surely lead to
an increase in crime, unemployment, and welfare).
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has never been held to be a fundamental right, 90 the lack thereof
for the children in this case could potentially lead to what Brennan
coined a “shadow population of illegal migrants.” 91 In light of the
statute’s negative effect, the state’s interests in maintaining its
limited resources for those with legal status proved to be
insubstantial. 92
Could S.B. 1070 or HB 56 be viewed under this level of
intermediate scrutiny? There is evidence that these laws have
caused anxiety in all Latinos regardless of citizenship status. 93
There is also the notion that the government-created “Hispanic”
classification groups otherwise culturally and nationally different
persons together for the purposes of discrimination. 94 The
90. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1,
38 (1973) (concluding that education is not a fundamentally guaranteed right);
Cf. id. at 111-114 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (pining for the Court to recognize
education as a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,
arguing that it is as equally important as the right to knowledge and the right
to participate in the democratic process).
91. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218.
92. Id. at 228-230 (identifying those State interests to be (1) the state
may protect itself from an influx of illegal aliens, (2) undocumented aliens
pose special burdens on the state’s ability to provide high-quality public
education, and (3) the unlawful presence of the children renders them less
likely than other children to remain within the United States); see id. at 230
(rejecting each state interest as insufficient, and failing to rise to the level of a
substantial interest).
93. See Racial Profiling After HB 56: Stories from the Alabama Hotline,
supra note 60, at 5, 10 (detailing Alabama’s problem with racial profiling in
the workplace, in schools, when dealing with police, and by private citizens
affecting both documented and undocumented Latinos); Alabama’s Shame: HB
56 and the War on Immigrants supra note 57, at 4-25 (listing specific negative
effects that HB 56 has had on the individuals of the Latino race through
anecdotal evidence); see also Santos, supra note 62 (revealing the state of
racial tension in Arizona through the questionable conduct of one of its own
sheriffs, who faced allegations from both the Justice Department and civil
rights groups of discriminatory police practices).
94. See GERALD JAYNES, NOT JUST BLACK AND WHITE: HISTORICAL AND
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON IMMIGRATION, RACE, AND ETHNICITY IN
THE UNITED STATES 106 (Forner & Frederickson eds., Russell Sage
Foundation 2004):
People of Puerto Rican, Nicaraguan, Mexican, Panamanian, and
Salvadorian descent find that they must negotiate U.S. society’s
relentless capacity to assimilate them under the homogenizing
designation ‘Hispanic.’ In doing so, they are perpetually challenged to
signal against a negative virtual social identity. ‘Hispanic’ . . . is ‘a
stereotyping machine’.);
see id. at 131:
In the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s [the United States] focused their energy
and vitriol mostly on one group – illegal immigrants from Mexico –
while ignoring illegals from other countries. The U.S. government’s
efforts to crack down on illegal Mexican immigrants have placed the
entire Mexican American community under suspicion, making illegal
immigrants, legal residents, and even native-born American citizens of
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“Hispanic” designation invites presumptions that mesh residents
together with undocumented aliens.
Plyler’s uniqueness is based on the fact that its heightened
standard has never been applied outside the context of elementary
education. 95 However, the law and its effects in Plyler are
somewhat analogous to the current situation in Arizona and
Alabama. Each law has resulted in deterring undocumented aliens
and their children from interacting with local government. 96
Negative effects such as these create a near parallel to the
situation in Plyler, where Texas denying children education
diminished their chance to become valuable contributors to the
well-being of society. 97 When there are “countervailing costs” such
as these, the level of scrutiny must be higher. 98
The purpose of each Arizona’s and Alabama’s statutory
provisions was to deter the influx of illegal immigration. 99 This is
unquestionably a legitimate state interest and also mirrors federal
objectives. 100 This mirroring aspect is the major distinction
between Arizona and Alabama’s law as compared to Texas’ law in
Plyler. 101 Under that view, rational basis seems like the more

Mexican descent vulnerable to scrutiny and governmental action.
95. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and
Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1734 (May 2010) (stating
that despite its unusual holding and unique plaintiff class, history has shown
Plyler did not prompt ”a new era in equal protection” for undocumented
aliens).
96. See Alabama’s Shame: HB 56 and the War on Immigrants supra
note 57, at 4 (indicating, much like in Plyler, that school children are afraid to
go to school for fear of potentially causing their parents’ deportation, not to
mention the threat of bullying by private citizens); see also Amanda J.
Crawford, Court Ruling Fuels Fear Among Hispanics in Arizona, BLOOMBERG
(June 26, 2012), www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-26/court-ruling-fuels-fearamong-hispanics-in-arizona.html (quoting various citizens who state that
“[p]eople are living in fear” because they believe, whether correctly or not, that
the new Arizona law is “criminalizing brown skin”).
97. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 233.
98. Id. at 224. Cf. id. at 249-254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (applying
the rational basis standard instead of Justice Brennan’s intermediate scrutiny
test, noting that the immigration problem is better left to the different
branches of both the federal and state governments rather than to the
judiciary).
99. H.B. 2162, 49th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010); ALA. CODE. § 31-13-2
(2010) (detailing the purpose of the statute in light of the legislative findings).
100. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509-2510 (considering section 2(B) of
Arizona’s law as a way to conduct state proceedings regarding immigration
according to the guidelines specified in 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g), which allow for
communication and delegation between the federal immigration agents and
local law enforcement); Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1284 (noting that the
consultation between local law officials and federal officials with regards to
immigration pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) is an important aspect of the
entire immigration system).
101. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226.
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appropriate test. However, as was suggested in Arizona, the
“show-me-your-papers” provision, although in step with a federal
scheme, was left open to future constitutional challenges. 102
Under Plyler, Arizona’s and Alabama’s interests must be
substantial and must be furthered by the scope of each statute’s
relevant provision. It follows that the relationship between the
means and ends be more precise than “reasonably related.” 103 This
heightened precision requirement may reveal that each state’s
statute sweeps too broadly so as to place a “shadow of
deportation” 104 upon its citizenry of a size and shape similar to the
shadow Brennan saw in Texas.
3.

Suspect Classifications and Strict Scrutiny

When a state classifies according to race, alienage, or
ancestry, the Court has subjected such legislation to strict judicial
scrutiny. 105 The Court attempts to identify classifications marked
with “indicia of suspectness.” 106 If the Court finds a suspect class,
the state must provide a compelling interest and the means of
implementation must be precisely tailored to further that
interest. 107

102. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510 (stating that this opinion does not
foreclose future preemption and constitutional challenges to the law as
interpreted by the state courts and applied by state officials after it goes into
effect).
103. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 236 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (invalidating the
Texas statute because it sweeps too broadly, making the classification of
children of undocumented aliens “fatally imprecise” and not related to the
goals of the statute).
104. Transcript of Obama’s Speech on Immigration Policy, N.Y. TIMES
(June 16, 2012), available at 2012 WLNR 12603721 (West 2012)
Effective immediately, the Department of Homeland Security is taking steps
to lift the shadow of deportation from these young people . . . [E]ligible
individuals . . . will be able to request temporary relief from deportation
proceedings and apply for work authorization . . . This is a temporary, stopgap
measure that lets us focus our resources wisely while giving a degree of relief
and hope to talented, driven, patriotic young people. (Emphasis added).
105. See generally Plyler, 457 U.S. 202; United States v. Carolene
Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (indicating what constitutes a suspect class).
106. See San Antonio Independent School Dist., 411 U.S. at 28 (noting
the indicia of suspectness necessarily includes “classes saddled with
disabilities, or subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to a position of political powerlessness”).
107. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217.
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a. Do Undocumented Aliens Constitute a Suspect Class?
The easy answer is provided by Graham v. Richardson, 108
which specifically excluded undocumented aliens from its
discussion of the alienage suspect class. 109 Without deviating from
this traditional holding, the states have authority to directly
regulate undocumented aliens if furthering a legitimate state
interest. 110 However, it has been argued that undocumented aliens
could constitute a subclass of alienage. 111 There are two obstacles
to that line of thinking.
First, the court in Mathews v. Diaz, 112 notes that the
federal government may discriminate between its citizens and
alien visitors, but also, that it need not treat all aliens alike. 113
Graham speaks only of “resident aliens” as being a part of the
suspect class. 114 These two cases suggest that when a suspect class
is based on alienage, undocumented aliens are not part of that
discussion, even as a subclass.
Second, even if the undocumented aliens were made a part
of that suspect class, Graham indicates that an important aspect
of these classifications is federal and state relations. 115 The federal
government, as noted, has broad discretion in regulating
immigration. 116 If a state regulates according to a federal objective
and neither “add[s] to nor take[s] from the conditions lawfully
imposed by Congress,” the classification is likely to be upheld
under a rational basis standard. 117
Arizona’s and Alabama’s laws were written to specifically
target illegal aliens. For this reason, it is difficult to argue that it
discriminates on the basis of alienage. Even if an argument could
be made, it is not apparent that either section is outside of the
warranted discretion provided by Congress. 118

108. Graham, 403 U.S. 365.
109. See id. at 376 (discussing only the rights of permanent resident
aliens for purposes of the suspect class without determining the rights and
analysis that would be given to undocumented aliens).
110. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355.
111. See Doe, 458 F. Supp. at 584 (hypothesizing that undocumented
aliens arguably fit the three criteria required for finding a suspect class).
112. Mathews, 426 U.S. 67.
113. See id. at 78 (revealing that the Court can identify different classes
of aliens based on their citizenship status and not all of them fit the mode of a
suspect classification).
114. Graham, 403 U.S. at 376.
115. Id. at 377.
116. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498.
117. Truax, 36 S. Ct. at 41.
118. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2527 (refusing to find section 2(B)
preempted because it operates “consistent[ly] with federal statutes.”).
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b. Does Each Section of the Arizona and Alabama Statutes Have
the Effect of Discriminating Against Latinos?
Although discriminating on the basis of race constitutes a
suspect classification, a statute will not be unconstitutional absent
a finding of discriminatory intent. 119 The legislatures in Arizona
and Alabama undoubtedly took precautionary measures to ensure
that, facially, their statutes would survive a discriminatory intent
analysis. 120
Justice Powell’s opinion in Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation 121 suggests
additional ways to find discriminatory intent. In reviewing the
racial effects of a zoning ordinance, Justice Powell discusses the
very difficult practice of finding a discriminatory purpose in a
legislative act. 122 However, he did not limit his inquiry to the
language of the ordinance, but also considered circumstantial
evidence of legislative intent. 123
He set out the following evidentiary factors for finding
discriminatory intent: (1) whether the effect of the State law bears
more heavily on one race than another; (2) whether the historical
background suggests that the laws were implemented for an
invidious purpose; and (3) whether the legislative history indicates
any reason behind the governmental action. 124
Although the provisions have only been in place for a short
period of time, their effect on the Latino population has already
been noted. 125 When does reasonable suspicion become racial
profiling? History of each state’s immigration enforcement,
especially in Arizona, may also evince some invidious purpose. As
noted earlier, the “Hispanic” classification invites shortcuts for
119. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (noting
that finding a discriminatory purpose behind an enacted statute requires proof
that the state legislature selected a course of action because of, and not in
spite of, its adverse effects upon a particular group).
120. H.B. 2162, 49th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (amending Arizona’s
S.B. 1070 enactment to make sure that race, national origin, and ancestry
would not be considered in its application).
121. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
122. See id. at 265 (noting that it is exceedingly rare that a legislature
would denote one purpose as being the primary or dominant one).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 266-68.
125. See, e.g., Racial Profiling After HB 56: Stories from the Alabama
Hotline, supra note 59, at 2-10; Alabama’s Shame: HB 56 and the War on
Immigrants, supra note 57, at 4-25 (detailing some dramatic stories from
Alabama Latino residents, including a boss refusing to pay his Latino
employee, a clinic refusing to treat a Latino patient, a traffic stop that ends up
splitting a Latino family, and the utilities at one Latino resident being shut off
shortly after HB 56 went into effect; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, supra
note 60, at 3-5; Santos, supra note 62.
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government officials to identify different persons as part of one
singular and possibly unlawful group. 126
Despite these concerns, there are factors that weigh
against finding discriminatory intent. First, the statute has been
found facially valid by the Supreme Court and the 11th Circuit. 127
Second, the laws were specifically written as anti-illegal
immigrant legislation, expressly forbidding enforcement on the
basis of race, national origin, or ancestry. 128 Third, the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency specifically
delegates to local officers discretion in identifying potentially
undocumented aliens and offers training in implementing that
discretion. 129 Finally, the Court’s decisions in U.S. v. BrignoniPonce 130 and U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte 131 identified a person’s
Mexican appearance as a relevant factor in stopping a potentially
undocumented alien. 132
All of these reasons make it less likely that, even with
proof of a discriminatory impact on the Latino populations of
Arizona and Alabama, each State’s statute would be struck down
on the basis that it discriminates against a suspect class.

IV. PROPOSAL
The issue of illegal immigration has become increasingly
difficult to address. Almost inevitably, race has become
126. JOSE LUIS MORIN, LATINO/A RIGHTS AND JUSTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES 9-10 (Carolina Academic Press, 2d Ed. 2009):
Increasingly, “Hispanic” is viewed as deficient and inaccurate. The term
“Hispanic has been deemed inappropriate, as an ethnic designator that
homogenizes and subsumes millions of persons in the United States
from diverse racial and ethnic origins and broad national and cultural
characteristics . . . It is a term that obscures the political struggle for
identity by Latin Americans in the United States . . . the label Hispanic
has been used to racialize and, through government sanction, officially
homogenize[.]
127. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510; Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1284.
128. H.B. 2162; ALA. CODE § 31-13-12.
129. Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority, Section 287(g)
Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, (last visited Oct. 26, 2012), www.ice.gov/news/library/factshe
ets/287g.htm (indicating that Immigration and Customs Enforcement will
train and work with local law enforcement to help combat illegal immigration
and is already working with fifty seven offices with some located in Arizona
and Alabama).
130. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
131. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
132. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 887 (allowing for race, or the
appearance of a particular race, to be a factor in making a police stop or
detention); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543; see also Ill. Migrant Council v.
Pilliod, 398 F. Supp. 882, 899 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (holding that Mexican ancestry
is a relevant circumstance to support a reasonable suspicion that a person is
in the country as an undocumented alien).
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inextricably connected to it. 133 The core of this proposal is twofold.
In light of all the constitutional difficulties that surround the
immigration issue, state enforcement of a law aimed at deterring
illegal immigration should be (1) challengeable under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution and (2) reviewable under a
heightened standard of judicial scrutiny. Even though both section
2(B) of S.B. 1070 and section 31-13-12 of HB 56 were within the
congressionally delegated powers of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 134 and thus
found not preempted by federal law, 135 the Supreme Court
indicated that both sections would be left open for future
constitutional challenges. 136
A major portion of the analysis of this Comment, and a good
starting point, is Brennan’s opinion in Plyler. Plyler stands for a
heightened level of judicial scrutiny in the context of
undocumented children’s education. 137 The language Brennan
used in his opinion is applicable today. Brennan was concerned
about a state law that would effectively create a “shadow
population” of undocumented aliens. 138 The Arizona and Alabama
laws have struck fear in both documented and undocumented
persons who may appear to be foreign, negatively impacting their
daily lives. 139
133. See Morin supra note 118, at 8, 61 (Carolina Academic Press, 2d
Ed. 2009) (pointing out that Latinos, the “fastest-growing minority group” in
the United States, are often stereotyped as “inferior, dangerous and criminal,”
making them targets for discrimination in the law); see also Frank H. Wu, The
Limits of Borders: A Moderate Proposal for Immigration Reform, 7 STAN. L. &
POLICY REV. 35, 39 (1996) (noting that “[e]ven if national sovereignty
establishes that the United States can and should distinguish among potential
new citizens, it does not directly follow that race-based restrictions on
immigration are natural or any more acceptable at the border than
elsewhere.”).
134. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(g); see also Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509 (noting
that cooperation between local and federal immigration enforcement do not
conflict with each other); Nicholas Michaud, From 287(g) to SB 1070: The
Decline of the Federal Immigration Partnership and the Rise of State-Level
Immigration Enforcement, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (Winter 2010)
(reviewing the efficacy of section 1357(g) of the IIRAIRA with respect to
facilitating immigration enforcement on the local level).
135. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509.
136. Id.
137. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
138. Id. at 218 (naming the lack of border control and the unlawful
employment of undocumented aliens as reasons for the creation of a “‘shadow
population’ of illegal migrants – numbering in the millions – within our
borders”); Cf. Transcript of Obama’s Speech on Immigration Policy, supra note
103 (labeling those undocumented workers and students a group of persons
beneath a “shadow of deportation”).
139. See Crisis in Alabama: Immigration Law Causes Chaos, AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (last visited Nov. 16, 2012), www.aclu.org/crisisalabama-immigration-law-causes-chaos (stating that the effect of the new
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This is where race becomes entangled with the immigration
policies
of
Arizona
and
Alabama.
Despite
having
antidiscrimination provisions within each law, 140 it is difficult to
imagine a scenario where race would not be a dominating factor in
forming a reasonable suspicion of a person’s undocumented status.
The employment of undocumented aliens, albeit a separate issue,
is analogous in this respect. 141 Lozano v. City of Hazelton 142 is just
one example involving employers safeguarding themselves against
hiring undocumented aliens by impermissibly discriminating
against potential employees on the basis of race. 143
The evidence of what Brennan referred to as “countervailing
costs” has been chronicled by the many Civil Rights groups that
intend to challenge the laws. 144 In sum, it reveals the formation of
another, more encompassing “shadow population” of the
“Hispanic” people. 145 Not only does this population include those
Alabama law “invites racial profiling of Latinos . . . who appear foreign to an
officer . . .”); see also Ortega Melendres v Arpaio, 598 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1037
(D. Ariz. 2009) (evidencing that racial profiling is already apparent in Arizona
where plaintiffs provided factual allegations including: evidence that Arizona
Sheriff Arpaio relies on physical appearance alone in determining immigration
statuses; that his crime sweeps are targeting Hispanic communities; and that
similarly situated Caucasians are not treated the same as the Hispanic
population when stopped for traffic violations); Santos, supra note 62; Some of
the Plaintiffs Challenging SB 1070, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (last
visited Nov. 16, 2012), www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights-racial-justice/someplaintiffs-challenging-sb-1070 (listing some of the plaintiffs who will be
challenging Arizona’s law, of which, some are concerned that they will be
targeted based on their appearance or ethnicity).
140. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2010) (“A law enforcement
official . . . may not consider race, color, or national origin in implementing the
requirements of this subsection . . .”); ALA. CODE. § 31-13-12(c) (“A law
enforcement officer may not consider race, color, or national origin . . .”).
141. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 218 (3d Cir. 2010)
(demonstrating through the legislative history of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act that sanctioning employers who hired illegal immigrants may
result in employment discrimination); id. (indicating that Congress sought to
combat the possibility employment discrimination brought on by local
immigration sanctions by “imposing sanctions of equal severity on employers
found guilty of discriminating”).
142. Lozano, 620 F.3d 170.
143. Id. at 219 (noting that a state regulation may enforce part of a
federal objective in an unconstitutional way or while enforcing one objective
the state could also “disregard Congress’ other objectives – protecting lawful
immigrants and others from employment discrimination . . .”).
144. Alabama’s Shame: HB 56 and the War on Immigrants, supra note
57, at 1-30; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, supra note 60, at 3-5; Racial
Profiling After HB 56: Stories from the Alabama Hotline, supra note 60, at 210.
145. Id.; see Alia Beard Rau et al., SB 1070 Opponents Blast Pearce Emails, THE REPUBLIC – AZCENTRAL.COM (July 20, 2012), www.azcentral.com
/news/politics/articles/20120719sb-1070-pearce-aclu-emails.html (quoting one
e-mail sent from Arizona State Senator Russell Pearce: “Can we maintain our
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undocumented Latino aliens positively contributing to society, 146
but also lawfully admitted Latino aliens and Latino U.S.
citizens. 147 Where so many persons of predominately the same race
are affected, state enforcement of this traditionally federal
objective should have to meet a higher standard of judicial review.
It is important to note the distinction between the Arizona
and Alabama laws and the Texas statute in Plyler. Brennan notes
the importance of the fact that the Texas statute does not operate
in step with any federal objective. 148 In contrast, both the Arizona
and Alabama laws operate within the scope of Congress’s
immigration objectives. 149 Despite this major distinction, states
may still act independently and unconstitutionally within the
scope of a federal scheme. 150 Antidiscrimination is entirely
important to the federal government, and while Federal
Immigration officers have the requisite training to handle
culturally difficult cases, 151 it is less apparent that local officials in

social fabric as a nation with Spanish fighting English for dominance . . . It's
like importing leper colonies and hope we don't catch leprosy. It's like
importing thousands of Islamic jihadists and hope they adapt to the American
Dream.”) (internal quotations omitted); Sushilo Rao, ‘Papers, Please’ Provision
Comes into Effect in Arizona, HARVARD LAW & POLICY REVIEW (Sept. 21,
2012), http://hlpronline.com/2012/09/papers-please-provision-comes-into-effectin-arizona/ (harping on the fact that Latinos will be the likely victims of racial
profiling).
146. Transcript of Obama’s Speech on Immigration Policy, supra note
103 (identifying those undocumented aliens who reside in the United States
and who the law should be helping as “young people who study in our schools
. . . pledge allegiance to our flag” and those who are willing to “go to college or
serve in our military . . .”).
147. See Ortega Melendres, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1037 (indicating that the
complaint alleges that once the officers knew of the plaintiff’s U.S. citizenship,
they released them from custody); see also Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 496 F.
Supp. 2d 477, 529 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (noting the possibility that the state law,
although targeted at undocumented aliens, will also affect “every employer,
every employee who is challenged or questioned as an undocumented alien
and every prospective employee especially those who look or act as if they are
foreign”).
148. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226.
149. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509 (noting that Arizona’s law works
according to federal delegations and in no way conflicts with its objectives); see
also Fact Sheet: Updated Facts on ICE’s 287(g) Program, IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY (last visited
Nov.
14,
2012),
www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g-reform.htm
(demonstrating that the federal delegation procedure “provides flexibility to
address issues of local concern, such as state and local laws or other needs of a
particular agency”).
150. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
151. See Fact Sheet: Updated Facts on ICE’s 287(g) Program,
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND
SECURITY (last visited Nov. 14, 2012), www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets
/287g-reform.htm (indicating that ICE offers a training program to local offers,
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Arizona or Alabama would have the same sensitivities. The line
between reasonable suspicion and racial profiling is less defined on
the state level. The standard for reviewing these socially adverse
effects should be more exacting under these circumstances.
Relying also on Justice Powell’s evidentiary sources in
Village of Arlington Heights, as analyzed above, it is not
unreasonable to conclude that these laws at least have the
potential to weigh more heavily on the Latino population than on
any other race or group. It has already been noted that Arizona
has one of the highest Hispanic populations in the nation. 152
Alabama’s census data revealed one of the fastest growing
Hispanic populations in the nation. 153 Combine those facts with
the numerous complainants that have lined up to challenge the
new laws on the basis of racial profiling, 154 and there is at least
circumstantial evidence that these laws, as applied in Arizona and
Alabama, would weigh more heavily on Latinos than on any other
race.
History can also provide some evidence of the
invidiousness of this legislative decision. Difficulties in
immigration enforcement near the U.S.-Mexican border have led
to Supreme Court decisions which seem to stretch the boundaries
of the Constitution. 155 In Martinez-Fuerte, Justice Brennan voiced
these concerns in a dissenting opinion. 156 He lamented the
practical negative effect the majority’s decision would have on
American citizens of Mexican ancestry. 157 He also distrusted the
subjective good faith of the local law enforcement to not solely rely
on a person’s race when using police discretion. 158

which specifically deals with “multicultural communication and the avoidance
of racial profiling”).
152. State and County Quickfacts – Arizona, supra note 52.
153. State and County Quickfacts – Alabama supra note 50; Djamba,
supra note 55, at 1.
154. Crisis in Alabama: Immigration Law Causes Chaos, supra note
138. Racial Profiling After HB 56: Stories from the Alabama Hotline, supra
note 60, at 2-10.
155. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
156. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543.
157. Id. at 572-573 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the
serious discriminatory consequences of the majority’s opinion for the MexicanAmerican who is selected because of his appearance and because that
appearance resembles the targeted Mexican undocumented alien). Id. (“That
deep seated resentment will be stirred by a sense of unfair discrimination is
not difficult to foresee.”).
158. Id. at 573 n.4 (indicating that the Court should not trust the good
faith of a local law enforcement official when something as important as
personal liberties are at stake); Id. (“The fact still remains that people of
Mexican ancestry are targeted for examination at checkpoints and that the
burden of checkpoint intrusions will lie heaviest on them.”).
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Lastly, Justice Thurgood Marshall’s Equal Protection
Clause jurisprudence makes an appropriate bookend for taking an
alternative approach to judicial review of immigration laws.
Justice Marshall was dissatisfied with the two-tiered approach in
Equal Protection cases. 159 He thought issues in cases like
Dandridge v. Williams 160 “defie[d] easy characterization in terms
of one or the other of these tests.” 161
Rather than always categorizing the issue as either
requiring rational basis or strict scrutiny review, Justice Marshall
viewed the analysis in three parts: (1) the character of the
classification in question; (2) the relative importance of the
discriminated class’ interests; and (3) the asserted state’s interests
supporting the classification. 162
Testing state laws and classifications in this way would
lead to a varying level of judicial scrutiny. 163 Under Justice
Marshall’s view, in cases that “def[y] easy characterization,” 164 the
“constitutional importance of the interests at stake” pitted against
the “invidiousness of the particular classification” will dictate
what survives judicial scrutiny. 165 Likewise, the means that the
states employ must reflect the importance of its interests and the
degree of invidiousness of the classification. 166
The laws in effect in Arizona and Alabama should be
reviewed according to that analysis. Each involves the personal
liberties of undocumented as well as documented Latinos. The
classification, although directly targeted at undocumented aliens,
has a certain degree of invidiousness, as it indirectly and
negatively affects legal Latino citizens as well. Finally, the
159. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 520 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (“This case simply defies easy characterization in
terms of one or the other of these tests.”); see generally San Antonio
Independent School Dist., 411 U.S. at 1 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Plyler, 447
U.S. at 202 (Marshall J., concurring).
160. Dandridge, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
161. Id. at 520.
162. Id. at 521; see also San Antonio Independent School Dist., 411 U.S.
at 109 (Marshall J, dissenting) (“[I]t seems to me inescapably clear that this
Court has consistently adjusted the care with which it will review state
discrimination in light of the constitutional significance of the interests
affected and the invidiousness of the particular classification.”); Plyler, 457
U.S. at 232 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“I believe that the facts of these cases
demonstrate the wisdom of rejecting a rigidified approach to equal protection
analysis . . . .”).
163. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 411 U.S. at 125 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
164. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 520 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
165. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 411 U.S. at 124 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
166. See id. at 125 (noting that the “Court traditionally has become
increasingly sensitive to the means by which a State chooses to act,” especially
if it directly affects “interests of constitutional significance.”).
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discretionary nature of the “reasonable suspicion” requirement in
the statute may not adequately protect the importance of the
Latinos’ constitutional interests involved.
The fact that Justice Marshall dissented in both
Dandridge and San Antonio Independent School District, 167 while
concurring in Plyler, suggests that Brennan’s decision in Plyler to
apply a heightened level of scrutiny was at least more consistent
with his idea of a varying level of judicial review. 168 The
prevalence of the immigration issue and the way in which the laws
are being enforced in Arizona and Alabama qualifies it as a case
that “defies easy characterization.” 169

V. CONCLUSION
Although
in
traditional
Equal
Protection
claims
undocumented aliens are not a suspect class, the situations in both
Arizona and Alabama present classifications that not only effect
undocumented aliens, but also lawfully admitted aliens and U.S.
citizens. Residing in the U.S. unlawfully does not require any
outward action or behavior. It does not require a certain
appearance. Neither does residing in the United States lawfully,
for that matter. “Reasonable suspicion” must draw upon
something. Too often that “suspicion” is based on race.
The threat that a law like this would create an
undocumented population living in the “shadow of deportation” is
in itself a concern similar to that presented in Plyler. The fact that
this law has borne, and will bear, more heavily on the Latino
population is circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory purpose.
Finally, as Justice Marshall so vehemently fought for during his
167. San Antonio Independent School District, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
168. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230-231 (Marshall, J., concurring) (concurring to
the extent that he does not abandon his approach to Equal Protection analysis
in San Antonio Independent School District); id. at 231 (internal quotations
omitted) (asking for “an approach that allows for varying levels of scrutiny
depending upon the constitutional and societal importance of the interest
adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which
the particular classification is drawn.”).
169. Some of the Plaintiffs Challenging SB 1070, supra note 138; Racial
Profiling After HB 56: Stories from the Alabama Hotline, supra note 60, at 210; Alabama’s Shame: HB 56 and the War on Immigrants, supra note 57;
Cecelia Chan, Hundreds March to County Jail to Protest SB 1070, THE
REPUBLIC – AZCENTRAL.COM (Sept. 22, 2012), www.azcentral.com/community
/phoenix/20120922immigration-law-protest-phoenix.html; Thousands Protest
HB 56 at Rally, CBS42.COM (Nov. 21, 2011), www.cbs42.com/content/localnews
/story/Thousands-protest-HB-56-at-Monday-rally/xTyRTs-41kC8ZgHk08nSMA
.cspx; Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2529 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Close and difficult
questions will inevitably arise as to whether an officer had reasonable
suspicion to believe that a person who is stopped . . . entered the country
illegally, and there is risk that citizens, lawful permanent residents, and
others who are lawfully present in the country will be detained.”).
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time on the bench, certain cases present issues that are not so
easily characterized as requiring rational basis or strict scrutiny
review. Cases that involve important constitutional and state
interests or involve difficult classifications should dictate what
level of scrutiny the court will use in determining its
constitutionality.
These factors demonstrate that not only are these laws
challengeable under the Equal Protection Clause, but they also
have a significance that calls for a stricter approach to finding
constitutional validity.

